Are we morally responsible for what we believe and intend? If so, what is the nature of thisresponsibility, and how does it differ from our moral responsibility for our outward bodily deeds?How is our moral responsibility for belief and intention grounded in mental action? I argue thatwe do bear a species of moral responsibility for our beliefs and intentions. But our beliefs andintentions are nonvoluntary-we neither believe nor intend 'at will.' ����is raises a pressingquestion about how we can be legitimately held accountable for the attitudes. Given that we donot choose our attitudes in the same way we choose to perform ordinary intentional actions, howdo we exercise agency in belief and intention? My answer is that responsibility for the attitudesis grounded in a fully intentional yet nonvoluntary form of mental action. ����is is a thinker'sreasoning to a conclusion in thought (or inferring). Drawing on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, Iargue that reasoning is active because it is constituted by the very species of self-consciouspractical knowledge as intentional bodily action. ����is practical knowledge positions a thinker toanswer the justificatory demands that mark our responsibility for the attitudes.